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FAMILY LAW*
DANIEL E. MURRAY **
The subject matter of this article is divided into the following sections:
1. Marriage and Annulment
2. Jurisdiction for Divorce
3. Vacating of Decrees
4. Grounds for Divorce
5. Alimony
6. Custody and Support of Children





12. Juveniles and Juvenile Courts
13. Illegitimacy
The reader is referred to other articles in this Survey for additional cases
which touched upon family law matters, but whose primary emphasis was
in the areas of contracts, torts, property, conflict of laws, and other fields.
Legislation enacted during the 1961 General Session of the Legislature
will be discussed in the appropriate sections of this article.
MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
Common Law Marriage
By the continued inaction of the Legislature, Florida remains one of
the sixteen' American states which still recognizes common law marriages.
Only four common law marriage cases reached the appellate level in Florida
in the last two years, and in each case the courts ruled against the existence
of the alleged marriage.
* The material herein surveyed includes the statutes enacted by the 1961 General
Session of the Florida Legislature and the cases reported from 113 So.2d 225 through
131 So.2d 927.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage - An Appraisal of Trends in
Family Orgamzation, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 88, 89 (1960). But see, Foster, Common Law
Divorce, 46 MINN. L. REV. 43, 48 (1961), who states that only fifteen states still recognize
common law marriages. Professor Foster's excellent article traces the development of
the common law marriage in Europe and in America. For a more sociological treatment
of the common law marriage problem, see Jordan, The Doctrine of Common Law Divorce,
14 U. FLA. L. REV. 264 (1961).
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The fundamental requisite in Florida for a common law marriage is the
proof of the mutual agreement to be husband and wife. This agreement
should be proved by the testimony of the parties if this is available; if it is
not, then proof of general repute and cohabitation will usually support a
presumption that there has been a marriage agreement. Nevertheless, if the
one seeking to establish the existence of the common-law marriage is not
one of the parties, it may not be sufficient for him to prove only cohabitation
and general repute when one of the alleged spouses denies the existence of
the common law marriage.2
It is the general rule in Florida that when the relationship between a
man and woman living together is meretricious in the beginning, it is pre-
sumed to continue until the contrary is proved. Therefore, when a man and a
married woman lived together for years and also for an additional period of
eight months after the death of the woman's first husband, it was held that
there was no evidence that the parties mutually agreed per verba de praesenti
to be husband and wife after the impediment was removed. Thus, the pre-
sumption was not rebutted.
3
When a husband and wife have been divorced, have kept the divorce
secret for religious reasons, and resumed cohabitation subsequent to the
divorce, it is proper for the court to disregard the testimony of the witnesses
that they considered the couple to be man and wife since the witnesses had
no knowledge of a change from the former status of husband and wife.
4
Although the state of New York does not recognize common law mar-
riages, seemingly it will recognize a common law marriage which was con-
summated in Florida by citizens of New York,", so long as there is no
impediment to their marriage under the law of New York.6
Plural Marriages
In order to rebut the presumption of the validity of a second marriage,
a presumption that is one of the strongest known to the law,7 it is necessary
2. McBride v. McBride, 130 So.2d 302 (Fla. App. 1961).
3. Marshall v. Sarar, 118 So.2d 258 (Fla. App. 1960). This case should be com-
pared with Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 814, 161 So. 836 (1935), in which the second "hus-
band" was unaware of the existence of his "wife's" first husband until two years after
the death of the first husband. The court held that a common law marriage came into
existence after the impediment was removed.
4. Harrington v. Miller, 123 So.2d 736 .(Fla. App. 1960). It should be noted
that the testimony indicated that the alleged husband: (1) continued alimony payments
to his alleged wife until her death and filed a separate income tax return showing these
payments; (2) remained silent about the decedent's marital status when asked by the
mortician and remained silent when the undertaker was told that the decendent was a
divorced woman; and (3) did not contribute towards the funeral expenses of the deceased.
5. Unowitz v. Unowitz, 210 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
6. Goebel, Family Law, 1960 Survey of New York Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1552
(1960).
7. McBride v. McBride, 130 So.2d 302, 304 (Fla. App. 1961).
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for the first wife to exhaust every reasonable possibility that her husband did
not secure a divorce from her. She must secure certificates negativing the
fact of divorce from the bureau of vital statistics of each state in which her
husband resided. If any of these states does not have a central recording
office, she must then obtain certificates from each county in those states "in
which there is evidence to show her husband resided." 8
Annulment
The district court has held, in an equivocal opinion, that a "suit for
annulment of marriage of an adult may not be maintained by an alleged
next friend."9 'r he court seemed to base its decision upon the statute which
provides that suits to enforce rights of an incompetent ward "shall be brought
jointly in the name of the guardian and the ward."' 1  Does this mean that
the court would have permitted a guardian to bring an annulment action?
It is clear that a guardian may neither institute" nor maintain 1'2 a divorce
action for an incompetent adult. The instant case should not be construed
as an adoption of a similar rule for annulment.
Legislation
Section 741.057 of the Florida Statutes was amended1 3 to provide that
the county judge may destroy physicians' certificates and laboratory reports
of blood tests of those applying for marriage licenses after they have been
filed for a period of sixty days.
JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE
Residence
Proof of residence is not required as a condition precedent for proceed-
ing with a suit for divorce; it is only a condition precedent to the granting
of a final decree of divorce. Therefore, when a husband wishes to contest
his wife's residence upon the basis that she did not leave the family's north-
erin domicile for just cause, he must assert this defense in his answer and not
by a special appearance and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over
the pcrson of the defendant.'
8. King v. Keller, 117 So.2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1960). See Quinn v. Miles, 124
So.2d 883 (Fla. App. 1960), for a similar view when the husband married three wives
and the first wife attempted to overcome the presumption of validity which existed in
favor of the last marriage.
9. Eden v. Eden, 130 So.2d 887 (Fla. App. 1961).
10. FLA. STAT. § 744.61 (1961).
11. Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
12. Wood v. Beard, 107 So.2d 198 (Fla. App. 1958).
13. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-17.
14. Fine v. Fine, 122 So.2d 494 (Fla. App. 1960). Corroborated and undenied
testimony that the plaintiff moved to Florida in September 1956, that he filed suit in
December 1956, and the last hearing before the lower court was in January 1958, was
sufficient to show a compliance with the former ninety day residence requirement.
Trethewey v. Trethewey, 115 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1959).
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In an alleged case of first impression, the district court has held that
although a wife who is living in a foreign state acquires the "domicile" of
her husband when he moves to Florida, she must actually reside in Florida
for the required six month period in order for the Florida court to have
jurisdiction of her divorce suit - domicile and residence being treated as
separate concepts. 15 It is submitted that the court overlooked the principle
of McIntyre v. McIntyre' 6 wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that
when a wife moved from Florida to Georgia while her husband continued
to reside in Florida, this alone did not deprive the Florida courts of juris-
diction even though she had been in Florida for a period of only four days
out of the six month period immediately preceding the filing of her suit for
divorce. In McIntyre the court drew no dichotomy between domicile and
residence.
7
In the last two years there have been relatively few attacks in foreign
states upon the validity of Florida divorces; the attack has been concentrated
upon Nevada and Mexican mail order divorces.'
Subject Matter
Seemingly, the Florida courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter
in a divorce suit when service of process has been perfected by constructive
service even though the marriage may have been dissolved by a prior foreign
divorce decree.'9
Process
An allegation contained in a sworn statement for service of process by
publication (and reiterated under oath in the complaint) "that the last
known address of said defendant was General Delivery, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia" 20 is not a compliance with the statute2' which requires that the sworn
statement specify "that the residence of such person is either unknown or
in some state or country other than Florida." The word "address" is not
synonymous with "residence," hence, the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendant. This lack of jurisdiction could not be cured by personal service
upon the defendant when the return of the sheriff was not made until after
the court had entered a divorce decree. Valid personal service gives the
15. Brown v. Brown, 123 So.2d 382 (Fla. App. 1960); noted in 15 U. MuMI L.
R v, 409 (1961).
16. 53 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1951).
17. The case of Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952), which was cited
by the court in Brown would not appear to be as revelant factually as the McIntyre case.
18. See Foster, Family Law, 1960 Annual Survey of American Law, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 629, 630 (1961); Goebel Family Law, 1960 Survey of New York Law, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1552, 1556 (1960); Ploscowc, Family Law, 1959 Annual Survey of American Law,
35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 388, 395 (1959).
19. Camp v. Camp, 120 So.2d 813 (Fla. App. 1960).
20. Wilmott v. Wilnott, 119 So.2d 54, 55 (Fla. App. 1960).
21. FLA. STAT. § 48.04(3) (1961).
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court jurisdiction over the person, but this jurisdiction must lie "dormant"
until proper proof of the regularity of the service is made prior to a decree
pro confesso and the final divorce decree.
22
VACATING OF DECREES
The distinction between a direct and a collateral attack on a final decree
of divorce was illustrated in the cases of Macfadden v. Muckerman23 and
Horra v. Horra.24 In Macfadden, a former wife filed a complaint in the
nature of a bill of review to set aside a divorce decree granted thirteen years
previously to her husband. She alleged that her former husband (now de-
ceased) had falsely claimed to be a legal resident of Florida when in fact he
was a mere sojourner or visitor. The court held that the complaint did not
state a cause of action because it merely alleged intrinsic fraud rather than
extrinsic fraud, i.e., the residence issue was intrinsic in that it could have
been litigated in the original proceedings. Extrinsic fraud, which would be
a basis for a collateral attack, could consist of allegations that the husband
fraudulently kept the wife from defending the action, or kept her in ignorance
of the proceedings, or indulged in other misconduct which deprived the wife
of an opportunity to defend the original proceedings. In Horra, the divorce
decree was set aside for fraud because the husband relied upon his wife's
representations that she was dismissing her suit for divorce, and he lived
with her during the fourteen months intervening between the filing of the
suit and the final decree. The wife's fraud upon which the husband relied
denied him "an opportunity to have his day in court." 25
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
The complete futility of our adversary system of divorce, which is based
upon the concept of fault, was well illustrated in the second appearance of
Vecsey v. Vecsey.26 The district court affirmed the actions of the chancellor
in denying a divorce, because of a lack of corroboration of his allegations, to
a bigamist husband who had been separated from the defendant (his first
wife) for thirty years. Will this decision preserve the sanctity of marriage?
Adultery
The incredibly protracted case of Chaachou v. Chaachott27 has wended
its way back into the appellate level for its fourth visit. The district court
22. Wilmott v. Wilmott, 119 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1960).
23. 116 So.2d 448 (Fla. App. 1959).
24. 118 So.2d 670 (Fla. App. 1960).
25. Id. at 671.
26. 115 So.2d 719 (Fla. App. 1959).
27. 118 So.2d 73 (Fla. App. 1960). It has been litigated for the last eight years.
The opinion seemed to indicate that the weary court was somewhat resigned to further
delay in order to allow the husband to present his claim as a ground for divorce and as a
1961]
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ruled that the husband should be allowed to amend his answer and to file a
counterclaim for divorce in order to allege adultery by his wife, even though
he allegedly knew of the adultery when he filed the original answer some
years ago.
It would seem obvious that when a husband procured an Alabama divorce
to be entered against himself (with the wife being the supposed plaintiff)
and the Alabama court later voided the decree, he had no standing in Florida
to claim a divorce based upon the ground that his wife had obtained a divorce
in Alabama.28  Further, when he continues to live with his second "wife"
after knowing of the voiding of the divorce decree, he is guilty of adultery
and his first wife would be entitled to a divorce. 29
Cruelty
The district court has affirmed the findings of a chancellor that it is
extreme cruelty for a seventy year old wife to accuse her sixty-nine year old
husband of having other women in his life and to leave him on eight differ-
ent occasions during their relatively brief marriage.30 It is submitted that
many men of this age would consider these accusations as flattery rather
than cruelty.
Desertion
After a husband leaves his wife she may move from the marital domicile
to other quarters, and this will not be construed as a willful and obstinate
desertion by her. The duty then rests upon the husband to prove that he
has re-established a home and invited the wife to join him before he can
support a charge of desertion.,' The period of desertion does not run during
the pendency of a suit for divorce, unless the divorce proceedings are a sham
and a pretense.32
Defenses
Although no acts of cruelty occurring after a defendant becomes insane
can be used as a ground for divorce, cruelty occurring before the adjudication
of insanity can be utilized. However, when a husband cohabits with an
insane wife and a child is born thirteen months after the adjudication,
it constitutes a condonation of any cruelty which occurred before the fact of
possible bar to alimony. For further procccdings see: Chaachou v. Chaachou, 122 So.2d
24 (Fla. App. 1960) and Cypn, Salmon & Cypen v. Chaachou, 130 So.2d 885 (Fla.
1961).
28. FLA. S'rA'r. § 65.04(8) (1961). See also Furman v. Furman, 130 So.2d 316
(Fla. App. 1961).
29. Choucherie v. Choucheric, 120 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1960).
30. McFarland v. McFarland, 131 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1961).
31. Reid v. Reid, 113 So.2d 574 (Fla. App. 1959). See also Bednar v. Bednar,
121 So.2d 456 (Fla. App. 1960).
32. Poerschke v. Poersehke, 114 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1959). Accord, Coppersmith
v. Coppersmith, 127 So.2d 711 (Fla. App. 1961).
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insanity. Any contention by a husband that his cohabitation was "thera-
peutic rather than marital" would be unavailing.
33
Two cases indicate that the courts may be attempting to tread the deli-
cate paths between recrimination, comparative rectitude and connivance, and
an innominate defense may be the result. In the first case,3 4 the district
court ruled that a chancellor had a duty to grant a divorce to the husband
when the testimony showed that the wife was "obviously at fault" and "the
husband, as near as possible, is free from fault."'35  In the second case 39 it was
decided that when a wife is more at fault than her husband in that she con-
tributed by her own conduct to the conduct of her husband of which she
complained, she has failed to prove grounds for divorce because she "engen-
dered and aggravated the marital trouble. '3 T This result is not based upon
the concept of recrimination, wherein each party has been guilty of a ground
for divorce, but rather on the notion that if a spouse has caused the other
spouse to act in an objectionable manner, she cannot complain about it.
If a husband lives with his second "wife" after his first wife's Mexican
mail-order divorce decree has been invalidated by a court of competent juris-
diction, lie is barred from obtaining a divorce because of the "clean hands"
doctrine.," This would appear to be a euphemistic term for adultery.
Proof
Inasmuch as the state is an interested party in all divorce litigation, it
is proper for the chancellor to conduct a "somewhat extensive examination"
of the complaining party when the defendant has failed to produce any
testimony and was not present either in person or by counsel. This "wide
discretion and latitude of examination of witnesses" would seem to be con-
fined to ex parte divorce hearings.3 9
Legislation
The former nile forbidding the taking of testimony on the merits in
divorce cases within a period of thirty days after the filing of the suit has
been repealed. The law now provides that no final decree of divorce may be
33. Trethcwcy v. Trethewey, 115 So.2d 712, 714 (Fla. App. 1959). See also
Raviues v. Raynes, 128 So.2d 417 (Fla. App. 1961). See the dissenting opinion of
Milledge, A. J. in Simon v. Simon, 114 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. App. 1959), for a discussion
of the defense of condonation.
34. Brummitt v. Brummitt, 115 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1959).
35. Id. at 577.
36. Harman v. Harman, 128 So.2d 164 (Fla. App. 1961).
37. Id. at 166.
38. Furman v. Furman, 130 So.2d 316 (Fla. App. 1961).
39. Walker v. \Walker, 123 So.2d 692. 694 (Fla. App. 1960). In this connection.
the reader should be referred to the case of Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So.2d 481 (Fla. App.
1961 ), wherein the district court has effectively emasculated the rule of the case of Harmon
v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209 (1949), as to the weight to be accorded the finding of a
special master.
1961]
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entered until at least twenty days have elapsed from the date of the filing
of the original complaint. If injustice will result from this delay, the court
is authorized to enter a decree at an earlier date. 0
ALIMONY
Right to Alimony
In answer to a certified question of the chancellor, a district court has
ruled that absent a statute there is no basis for a Florida court to award
alimony to a husband even though the equities are with him; the wife was
guilty of extreme cruelty and she "has done physical violence to him which
has resulted in his being wholly incapacitated to earn a livelihood. '41  This
matter should receive the careful consideration of the legislature. Since
the wife is free from suit for injuries inflicted during coverture 42 and is not
liable for alimony upon divorce, the husband is at the mercy of his wife.
Alimony is an allowance to the wife from the husband for her support
in lieu of the legal obligation of the husband to support her. It is, there-
fore, error to order that alimony and medical bills for the wife should be
charged against joint funds of the husband and wife.' 3
Retention of Jurisdiction
A series of cases have delineated the dangers involved when a final
decree fails to provide for alimony and fails to retain jurisdiction in the
future. In the first case 4 it was decided that an ex-wife has no right in
equity to apply for alimony when a prior divorce decree did not allow her
alimony and did not retain jurisdiction to award it. Section 65.1544a of the
Florida Statutes which provides for modification of decrees relative to
alimony is of no assistance because it applies, by its terms, only in those
cases where alimony was provided for by agreement or by the decree itself.
In the second case, Schiff v. Schiff,45 it was held that it is an abuse of
discretion for a chancellor to deny alimony to a wife without reserving
jurisdiction of the case in the event that a change in the wife's financial
condition makes an award of alimony necessary. It is seemingly impossible
to reconcile this case with Kirby v. Kirby40 which held that it was within
the discretion of a chancellor to deny an award of alimony without reserving
40. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-123.
41. Davies v. Davies, 113 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. App. 1959).
42. Comment, 14 U. MIAMi L. REV. 99 (1959). See also Amendola v. Amendola,
118 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1960), appeal transferred, Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d 805
(Fla. App. 1960).
43. Simon v. Simon, 123 So.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1960).
44. Weiss v. Weiss, 118 So.2d 833 (Fla. App. 1960).
44a. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1961).
45. 123 So.2d 295 (Fla. App. 1960).
46. 111 So.2d 299 (Fla. App. 1959). Odom, J. in the Schiff case pointed out the
apparent conflict between Sehiff and Kirby.
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jurisdiction. Until the conflict between Kirby and Schiff is resolved, it
would appear unwise for a wife's counsel to acquiesce in the drafting of a
decree which does not retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future
if the circumstances change.
This retention of jurisdiction facet was further illustrated in a case
in which the divorce decree stated, inter alia, "that the parties . . . are
satisfied to leave the question of alimony and the support of the child
to the necessities and requirements of the plaintiff and the liberality and
ability of the defendant father. ' ' 47  The decree retained jurisdiction of the
cause "to make from time to time such orders as may from time to time
become proper .... ,,48 The court denied the wife's claim to collect
amounts of money which the husband had failed to pay pursuant to an
oral agreement because there was no finding in the original decree as to
any specific amount for alimony. Nevertheless, the wording of the final
decree was broad enough to show that the chancellor reserved jurisdiction
to award alimony to be paid in the future upon proper application by
the wife.
Amount
A husband's liability for alimony cannot be based solely upon his
annual income as disclosed by his federal income tax returns. If he spends
more than his reported income for living expenses his wife is entitled to
alimony commensurate with his living standards "in the absence of a full
disclosure by the husband showing his inability to pay."'49
The district court (in affirming a chancellor's award of alimony)
approved a novel "Quarterly Income Adjustment Formula" as a solution to
the perplexing problem faced by a professional golfer who must pay alimony
to his ex-wife, but who is faced with the fact that his income will vary
depending "upon the element of luck, continued good health, as well as his
skill ..... ,50 This formula, or some modification of it, would seem applica-
ble to many occupations and professions which have erratic income
fluctuations.
47. Zoercher v. Zoercher, 114 So.2d 728, 729-30 (Fla. App. 1959).
48. Id. at 731.
49. Klein v. Klein, 122 So.2d 205, 206 (Fla. App. 1960); accord, Howard v. How-
ard, 130 So.2d 83 (Fla. App. 1961).
50. Sanders v. Sanders, 125 So.2d 916. 917-18 (Fla. App. 1961).
"By his decree the chancellor accepted and approved the Special Master's recom-
mendation that defendant husband be required to pay to his wife as alimony a sum
equivalent to $175 per month or $2,100 annually. However, in view of the husband's
complete dependence for a livelihood upon the element of luck, continued good health,
as well as his skill, the chancellor was unwilling to require that the alimony to be paid by
him be in equal and even-flowing amounts on the first day of each month. Instead, the
chancellor devised a formula under which the defendant is required to pay to the wife $100
a month for child support as recommended by the Master, together with the sum of $50
a month as alimony. The decree further provides that since these two items, together
with the husband's normal expenses of operation, amount to approximately $20,000 a year,
the husband is required to file with the court at the end of each calendar quarter a state-
1961.]
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Tax Factors
In a case of apparent first impression, a district court of appeal has
decided that a divorce decree which awards one weekly sum for alimony and
support of the minor child may be modified by having the chancellor (upon
remand of the case) allocate separate amounts for child support and alimony
for tax purposes of the husband.r1 The tax consequences of this decision (and




In a case of first impression in Florida, a district court has ruled that
when a husband has requested a decrease in an alimony award and the wife
has counterclaimed for an increase, or in the alternative for a lump sum
award, the chancellor has discretion to enter a lump sum award."5 It is sub-
mitted that this decision is based upon a somewhat strained construction of
sections 65.0854 and 65.1514a of the Florida Statutes.
In the absence of an agreement between the parties, alimony ceases
upon the death of the husband. 5  Section 65.08 provides that alimony
may be awarded in the form of "periodic payments or payment in a lump
sum." A synthesis of these two principles makes it clear that it is error
to award alimony in weekly installments and a fixed sum "in lieu of post-
demise alimony."5
ment of his total earnings during the preceding quarterly period. Thc decree providcs
that if the husband's quarterly earnings exceed the sum of $5,000 (this being one-fourth
of his annual fixed obligations as mentioned above), then he is required to pay to his
wife in a lump sum one-fifth of all income received by him during such quarter aboc the
fixed sum of $5,000. Such payments out of excess earning shall be made each quarter
until the wife has received the full $2,100 a year alimony as recommended by the Special
Master. The husband must look to the remaining excess earnings for the payment of
income taxes, extraordinary expenses and the accumulation of an estate. It is obvious
from the decree appealed that if the husband's gross earnings do not exceed $5,000 during
any quarterly period of the calendar year, then his obligation to pay alimony to his wife
is limited to the sum of only $50 a month as otherwise provided for in the decree. By
the same token, his inability to cam in excess of the stipulated amount in any quarterlY'
period will conclusively demonstrate his financial inability to meet the needs of his
former wife." -Ibid.
51: Rogoff v. Rogoff, 115 So.2d 456 (Fla. App. 1959); accord, Ginsberg v. Gins-
berg, 127 So.2d 137 (Fla. App. 1961); Hardy v. Hardy, 118 So.2d 106 (Fla. App. 1960).
52. The reader should be cautioned that these cases must be considered in light of
the recent case of Commissioner v. Lester, 81 Sup. Ct. 1343 (1961). It was held that a
property settlement which provided that a divorced husband's payments to his ex-wife
were to be reduced one-sixth as each child of the marriage reached his majority did
not preclude him from deducting the full amount of the payments. Under section 22(k)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, added by Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619. § 120.
56 Stat. 816 (1942), the husband cannot deduct those amounts for support of children if
the agreement fixes specific portions of the payments as payable for this support.
53. Moore v. Moore, 113 So.2d 878 (Fla. App. 1959).
54. FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1961).
54a. Supra note 44a, and accompanying text.
55. 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 378 (1959).
56. Deigaard v. Deigaard, 114 So.2d 516, 517 (Fla. App. 1959); accord, Ehrlich
v. Ehrlich, 130 So.2d 630 (Fla. App. 1961).
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When a husband and wife own their home as tenants by the entirety,
it is proper for the chancellor to award the home to the wife as a lump
sum alimony award. This is particularly true when the wife contributed
more to the purchase and maintenance of the home than did the husband,
the husband will soon reach retirement age, and the wife has no income,
but has been able to maintain the home by renting rooms. This arrange-
ment provides for the wife without burdening the husband with periodic
payments from a small income.5 7 On the other hand, it is error to award
the wife a one-half interest in the home which was owned by the husband
alone, in addition to periodic alimony, because this would constitute a lump
sum alimony award in the absence of proof that the wife had a separate
equity in the home acquired by her contributions towards its acquisition
or maintenance. 8
Enforcement
The proof of unpaid amounts of alimony will not entitle a wife, as a
matter of right, to an order of commitment of her husband for contempt.
Hence, when the ex-husband demonstrates his inability to pay, he is not
in willful contempt and the chancellor would not be in error in refusing
to make the rule absolute.5  The respondent need not be personally served
with process, but he may be served by mail or other method which will
convey notice to him of the proceedings. If the cause is still pending because
of an undisposed of petition for rehearing and the same attorney is prose-
cuting the petition, then notice upon the attorney will bind the respondent.
However, if the decree has become final, service upon the attorney who
represented the respondent in the original cause will not be sufficient if the
respondent does not receive notice of the proceedings and the attorney
denies that he presently represents the respondent. 0
A district court in the first appearance of Howard v. Howard1 artfully
avoided the question of whether alimony payments to a former wife may be
57. Janczcvski v. Janczewski, 114 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1959).
58. Harrison v. Harrison, 115 So.2d 709 (Fla. App. 1959); accord, Bailey v. Bailey.
126 So.2d 165 (Fla. App. 1961). It is proper for a chancellor to order that the home
be utilized as a residence place for the wife and children. Ibid. Correspondingly, when
the custody of children has been taken from the mother and given to the father, the
court has the right to amend a prior decree which gave the mother the right to occupy
the home formerly owned as an estate by the entireties and to adjudicate the interests of
children whose trust funds werc utilized in the purchase of the property. It is proper
for the chancellor to establish the rights of the parties in the property, but not to divide
it. Brown v. Brown, 123 So.2d 298 (Fla. App. 1960). In appropriate circumstances, it
is within.the discretion of the chancellor to enter a temporary restraining order, ordering
a husband to remove himself from the marital domicile and enjoining him fom interfering
with or molesting his wife. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg. 113 So.2d 565 (Fla. App. 1959). See
also McFarland v. McFarland, 131 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1961) (presumption of a gift
to the xife in an estate by the entireties) and the excellent article by Starling, The Tenancy
by the Entireties in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 111 (1961).
59. English v. English, 117 So.2d 559 (Fla. App. 1960).
60. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 122 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1960). See also Arrington
v. Brown, 116 So.2d 461 (Fla. App. 1959), regarding a judgment entered for unpaid
child support after notice by mail.
61. 118 So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1960). The court stated that "a net loss in income
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satisfied out of property held as an estate by the entirety by a former
husband and his second wife. The chancellor raised this question and
decided that it could not be done. The district court directed the chan-
cellor to increase the alimony award, and stated that if the husband failed
to pay the amount of any increased award this may "ultimately pose a
question in the solution of which the law relating to satisfaction of judgments
out of property held by the entireties may have to be necessarily consid-
ered."62 The chancellor then increased the amount of alimony and, upon
default of the husband, held him in contempt. The district court affirmed
the increased award under the theory that both the husband and his second
wife were charged with knowledge of the continuing liability of the husband
when they acquired property as tenants by the entirety. The court expressly
avoided ruling as to whether the act of vesting title in this manner was
voidable as tending to delay or defraud the former wife in the enforcement
of her claims. In effect, the court placed the burden upon the husband
to convince his second wife that they should liquidate some of their holdings
in order to purge himself of the contempt.'13
Contempt proceedings are not the sole method of enforcing alimony
awards. If the original alimony award was entered by a Florida court, the
enforcing court can enter a money judgment for past due amounts and also
adjudicate a husband guilty of contempt for failure to pay the sums adjudged
in arrears. 4  If the original alimony award was made in a foreign state,
Florida courts may enter a money judgment for past due alimony install-
ments even though they have not been reduced to judgment in the render-
ing foreign state. Of course, if the law of the foreign state provides that
the original decree may be modified as to accrued installments, then the
Florida court has no power to enter a judgment. The burden of alleging
and proving that the foreign state permits the modification of accrued
installments rests upon the defending party, and he is not assisted by the
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act 5 since it does not work
automatically.66 The Florida courts may refuse to enforce a foreign state's
judgment for arrears of alimony and support when the original decree for
alimony and child support had been obtained by trickery and fraud on the
husband, and the husband is able to present "other equitable defenses." ' 7
during one year is not determinative of a husband's ability to pay alimony. In addition
to income, consideration must also be given to the extent and value of the husband's
capital assets. The manner in which title to the husband's assets is held is not necessarily
controlling in determining his ability to pay." Id. at 94.
62. Ibid.
63. Howard v. Howard, 130 So.2d 83 (Fla. App. 1961).
64. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 123 So.2d 57 (Fla. App. 1960). The court also reaffirmed
the holding in the first hearing that service upon the attorney in a pending cause will bind
the client. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
65. FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1961).
66. Miller v. Schulman, 122 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1960).
67. Klein v. Klein, 113 So.2d 855, 856 (Fla. App. 1959).
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A claim for accrued alimony may be barred by the defense of waiver
by acquiescence when the wife has delayed in the assertion of her claim,
thereby putting the husband off his guard and leading him to believe that
she has waived her claim. This defense must be pleaded and proved by
the husband as it is an affirmative defense.6
Modification
Even though a husband is in arrears in the payment of alimony, he
may seek modification of future alimony if his failure to pay has been caused
by conditions beyond his own control. Of course, the accrued alimony
cannot be modified because it is a vested property right.6 9 Correspondingly,
when a decree which modifies the amount of alimony is ambiguous in that
it fails to indicate clearly that the modification shall be prospective rather
than retroactive, it should be interpreted as being prospective only in order
to uphold its validity. 0 A petition for modification is not the proper pro-
cedure for the claiming of alimony after a wife has relinquished monthly
alimony payments in consideration for the conveyance of property and this
arrangement has been approved by the chancellor.71 A petition for a
rehearing enables a chancellor to reconsider not only the particular points
involved in the rehearing but the entire matter. Therefore, the chancellor
may alter alimony provisions of a final decree even though no additional
evidence is introduced on this issue and the rehearing is confined to the
introduction of additional testimony relative to the custody of children.72
A petition to modify a prior alimony decree is supplemental to the original
decree. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the petition to be filed in the
original divorce suit; it may be separately styled and assigned a new file
number.73
Florida Appellate Rules
Rule 3.8 of the Florida Appellate Rules has been amended to provide
that in appeals from orders or decrees awarding separate maintenance, sup-
port or alimony, the lower court may order the payment of separate mainte-
nance, support or alimony pending the appeal. The acceptance of these
benefits is to be without prejudice to the wife's attacking the correctness
of any of the provisions of the original decree which is being appealed . 4
68. Davis v. Davis, 123 So.2d 377 (Fla. A pp. 1960).
69. English v. English, 117 So.2d 559(Fla.App. 1960) (separate maintenance
action).
70. Mack v. Mack, 115 So.2d 447 (Fla. App. 1959).
71. The wife would have to offer to, return the property and prove fraud, mistake
or misrepresentation in the original agreement before she would have a cause of action
which would not fall under the provisions of FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1961). Graves v.
Graves, 115 So.2d 451 (Fla. App. 1959).
72. Cole v. Cole, 130 So.2d 126 (Fla. App. 1961).
73. Green v. Green, 130 So.2d 293 (Fla. App. 1961).
74. In re Florida Appellate Rules, 1,1 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1961).
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CUs'ToDv AND SUrroR'r ot., CHILDREN
Custody
JURISDICTION
The old rule articulated in Dorman v. Friendly7 1 that a child must be
within the jurisdiction of a state which attempts to determine custody has
been overruled by Rhoades v. Bohn.70  In Rhoades, a Wisconsin decree
(pursuant to a stipulation of the parties) awarded custody of a minor to
the father. The father and child moved to Florida, and years later the
mother petitioned the Wisconsin court for custody which was granted to
her. The wife sought to enforce the Visconsin decree in Florida, and the
husband resisted upon the ground that the Wisconsin court lacked juris-
diction over the child. The Florida courts overruled Dorman upon tile
basis that the times have changed; a "substantial segment of our population
may be characterized as highly mobile '77 With the result that parents may
remove their children from Florida "within a matter of hours" 78 and thereby
render the Florida courts powerless to deal with their custody. However,
the court did refuse to grant "unquestioned enforcement" 79 to tile \Vis_
cousin decree (under the full faith and credit clause) because a custody
decree is interlocutory under the law of Wisconsin and Florida in that it
is subject to modification for tile welfare of the child. The case was re-
manded for further consideration on the merits. Somewhat in accord with
this reasoning, a temporary custody order entered in a Georgia court in
habeas corpus proceedings was held not entitled to full faith and credit
in Florida, nor would habeas corpus proceedings lie for the purpose of
determining which parent was entitled to custody of a minor child when
that issue was involved in another current proceeding between the parents.8,
Although the custody decree of a foreign state is not entitled to full faith
and credit in Florida, it is proper for the Florida court to determine that
the foreign decree is a valid and subsisting order of a court of competent
jurisdiction and to refuse to disturb the order in the absence of proof that
there has been a change in circumstances since the rendition of the foreign
decree.8'
The posting of a supersedeas bond on appeal is required in order to
deprive the lower court of jurisdiction over a custody case; in the absence
of the bond, the appellate court will refuse to enforce the order of the
chancellor or direct the entry of any specific order.82
,5. 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734 (1941).
76. 114 So.2d 493 (Fla. App. 1959), aff'd, 121 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1960).
77. Rhoades v. Bohn, 114 So.2d 493. 497 (Fla. App. 1959).
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 499.
80. Wilmott v. Wilmott, 122 So.2d 486 (Fla. App. 1960).
81. Shenk v. Shenk, 126 So.2d 286 (Fla. App. 1961).
82. justice v. Van Eepoel, 113 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1959). Upon remand of this case,




The touchstone in all child custody cases is the ultimate welfare of
the child. This glittering generality is deceptive in that it seems difficult,
if not impossible, to weave a continuous thread running through the cascs.
Four cases will illustrate this point. In the first case,83 the custody of two
children was awarded to their maternal grandmother against the claim
of their father. The desire of the children to live with their grandmother
was treated as "a very decisive factor.'8 4  In the second case,8 5 custody of
a young girl was maintained by the maternal grandparents over the objection
of both parents of the child. The wishes of the child were not presented
to the court and the father alleged substantial changes in circumstances.
The decision of the chancellor was based primarily upon "the effect upon
the child of changing custody so close to the inception of a new school
year."8 6 In the third case,8 7 a wife secured a divorce, but custody of the
two children was awarded to the husband who was to keep them in the
home of his parents. Subsequently, the wife petitioned for a change of
custody upon the basis that the home of the two children had been changed
to another city with the result that it was difficult for her to see them.
The district court affirmed the chancellor's awarding of custody to the
mother because the father had remarried and had not attempted to take
the children into his new home; the mother had steady employment and
had an apartment which would accommodate the two children and the
move of the children had made it difficult for her to visit them. The court
believed that the lower court's decree recognized the "natural God-given
right of a parent"88 to have custody, and that the best interests of the chil-
dren lay with custody in the mother. It seems a bit difficult to apply the
maxim "God-given right of a parent"8 when there are two parents. The
fourth case 90 is basically in accord with the preceding case. However, the
court did caution that a finding by the trial judge that "'it is in the best
interest' of the child that she remain with her aunt and uncle is not equiva-
lent to a finding that the ultimate welfare of the child requires that she
be with her aunt and uncle." '  This semantic divergence was based upon
the view that the lower court gave weight to the fact that the aunt and
court, but entered only a temporary order which the court, on the fourth appearance,
affirmed subject to the right of both parties to introduce evidence and to apply for a
final order concerning the custody of the two children. justice v. Van Eepoel, 121
So.2d 655 (Fla. 1960).
83. Eades v. Dorio, 113 So.2d 232 (Fla. App. 1959).
84. Id. at 234.
85. Bouchard v. Bouchard, 119 So.2d 819 (Fla. App. 1960).
86. Id. at 822.
87. Johnson v. Johnson, 114 So.2d 338 (Fla. App. 1959).
88. Id. at 341.
89. This "God-given right" reasoning of the Florida courts has been termed "hor-
rible" by one distinguished author. Foster Family Law, 1960 Annual Survey of American
Law, 36N.Y.U.L. REV. 629, 636 n.44 (161).
90. Foster v. Sharpe, 114 So.2d 373 (Fla. App. 1959).
91. Id. at 376.
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uncle could afford to give more to the child than the child's mother could
- this is not the sole criterium to be used in determining custody.
DIVIDED CUSTODY
It now seems fairly well established that it is within the discretion
of the chancellor to provide that one parent should have custody of the
children during the school year and the other parent should have custody
during the summer vacation.92
LEGISLATION
The change of name laws have been amended so as to provide that
when only one parent petitions for a change of a minor's name, notice of the
petition must be served upon the other parent with proof of service being
filed in the cause. This change will give some protection to a father whose
former wife has reiarried. 3
Support
94
The general rule is that a father is not legally obligated to support his
children after they become adults.", Nevertheless, this rule may be circum-
vented, indirectly, under certain circumstances. For example, it has been
held that when a husband had previously deposited money in a bank in his
name as trustee for his wife, it was not erroneous for the court upon the
divorce of the parties to order the wife to hold a portion of the money in
trust for the son's college education. The father's protests that this decree
would in effect force him to support his son after he had reached his majority
and while he was still in college were held unavailing.00
It is also the general rule that a father is not obligated to support his
minor children after his death. However, if one provision of an ambigu-
ously worded separation agreement indicates that the father was to support
the child from his estate, the court will choose that interpretation which is
in accordance with the best interests of the child. This is particularly true
when the father has indicated in his will that he considered that the sepa-
ration agreement had made provision for the child. 7
Two cases illustrated the difficulties which will arise in determining
the father's financial obligations when children are in his custody tempo-
92. Metz v. Metz, 108 So.2d 512 (Fla. App. 1959), and Harrison v. Harrison, 115
So.2d 709 (Fla. App. 1959). See also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 127 So.2d 136 (Fla.
App. 1961), which seemed to approve of a decree awarding split custody.
93. Fla. Laws 1961, cl. 61-152.
94. The reader is referred to the comprehensive annotation, Father's Liability for
Support of Child Furnished After Entry of Decree of Absolute Divorce Not Providing for
Support, 69 A.L.R.2d 203 (1960).
95. See 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 108 (1960).
96. Deigaard v. Deigaard, 114 So.2d 516 (Fla. App. 1959).
97. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 131 So.2d 509 (Fla. App. 1961).
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rarily or in the temporary custody of the wife. If a father sends his child
to visit with the child's mother, he is obligated to pay the child's transporta-
tion costs together with a sufficient amount to support the child while he is
in the custody of his mother. However, the father should not be compelled
to pay money "to finance a true vacation for the child and the mother
to be together."98 On the other hand, if the divorce decree provides that
the father is to pay a fixed weekly amount for the support of the children,
he cannot be relieved of this obligation in contempt proceedings for the
period when he bad custody of the children. The decree providing for a
fixed weekly sum cannot be interpreted in contempt proceedings when it is
clear and unambiguous; the court may modify the decree (in a proper
proceeding) if a change in circumstances can be shown. 9
If a nonresident husband appears specially and moves to dismiss the
complaint for want of jurisdiction over either of the parties, it is error for
the court to enter a decree for child support; the court may determine that
it has jurisdiction to enter the divorce, but it cannot enter an in personam
decree unless it has jurisdiction over the defendant. 100 If jurisdiction of the
cause is not retained for any purpose, it is error for the chancellor ex mero
motu to vacate portions of a final decree which invalidated a declaration of
trust for the support of minor children.' 0 '
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT DECREES
If all of the principles of Hardy v. Hardy'0 2 arc followed in subsequent
decisions, it would appear that fathers now have an effective means of
enforcing visitation rights granted in divorce decrees. In Hardy the court
enunciated these principles: (1) a court may not cancel past due alimony
because of the wife's failure to accord child visitation privileges provided
for in the divorce decree; (2) when the mother is able to support her
children, the court has the discretion to cancel future child support pay-
ments by the father in order to penalize the mother for her refusal to accord
visitation privileges; (3) the court has the power to "cancel and discharge
an accumulated indebtedness for support of a minor child where the mother
has failed or refused to comply with the custody provisions of the decree.' 103
The author has no quarrel with the first two statements; however, it would
appear that the court has confused the distinction between the equitable
discretion of a chancellor to refuse to enforce the payment of accrued child
support by contempt proceedings with the separate problem of cancelling
the indebtedness. The cases cited by the court seemed to agree that a
98. Zoercher v. Zoercher, 114 So.2d 728, 732 (Fla. App. 1959).
99. Morrison v. Morrison, 122 So.2d 199 (Fla. App. 1960).
100. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 130 So.2d. 639 (Fla. App. 1961).
101. Ames v. Ames, 126 So.2d 754 (Fla. App. 1961).
102. 118 So.2d 106 (Fla. App. 1960); accord, Clawson v. Clawson, 125 So.2d 104
(Fla. App. 1960).
103. Hardy v. Hardy, 118 So.2d 106, 109 (Fla. App. 1960).
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chancellor may refuse to lend the equitable process of contempt to the
collection of accrued support payments; apparently, none of them decided
the more important question of cancelling vested property rights.
If a valid divorce has been obtained in a foreign state, but portions
of the final decree dealing with child support have been obtained by fraud
and trickery upon th6 husband, the Florida court may refuse to enforce
the foreign decree for child support. Nevertheless, under the doctrine of
"divisible divorce,"' 04 the Florida court should then enter a domestic decree
for support based upon the circumstances and needs of the parties. 1 5 On
the other hand, Florida will accord full faith and credit to valid foreign
decrees for child support in order to enforce a claim for unpaid amounts
unless the decree is subject to retroactive modification by the rendering
state. The presumption is that the foreign state has no power to modify
accrued amounts, and the burden of proving the contrary rests upon the
person defending the claim. 106
In a case of apparent first impression, a district court of appeal has
held that a chancellor has the power, under appropriate circumstances, to
"require a divorced father to maintain insurance on his life as security for
the payment of maintenance and support awarded his minor children."' 07
The court, in dicta, stated "that a court has no power to require a divorced
father to build an estate payable to his children upon his death."' 108 Justice
Sturgis, in dissenting, clearly showed that the majority opinion has the
effect of requiring a father to "build an estate" for his children - an act
which the court admits it is without power to require.'
A court is entitled to sequester real property belonging to an ex-husband
in order to apply it in payment of amounts due from him to his ex-wife
for past due child support and for her advances on his behalf in payments
on the mortgage encumbering this real property." 0 In addition to juridical
proceedings, a wife may also be permitted to employ extra-judicial remedies.
It is error to enjoin a wife from communicating with her former husband,
a career officer in the United States Army in Germany, "or with any officials
104. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Ila. 1950). It would appear that Florida is
one of the few states that has the "divisible divorce" concept as the result of judicial law-
making. With the recent notable exception of California, few states have achieved this
result without the aid of a statute. Foster, Family Law, 1960 Annual Survey of Amer-
ican Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 629, 633 (1961).
105. Klein v. Klein, 113 So.2d 855 (Fla. App. 1959).
106. Edgar v. Edgar, 126 So.2d 585 (Fla. App. 1961).
107. Riley v. Riley, 131 So.2d 491, 494 (Fla. App. 1961).
108. Id. at 491.
109. Ibid.
110. Garland v. Garland, 118 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1960). rhe decree should state:
(1) the amount of these mortgage payIncnts; (2) the value of the real property in order
that no more of its value than is necded for repayment to the ex-wife should be taken; (3)
the net value of the property over and above any existing mortgages; and (4) the amount




of the War Department of the United States" about the conduct of her
ex-husband "or concerning his legal obligations to her and/or his chil-
dren" '' because this would preclude her from any real means of enforcing
the decree for support.
12
LEGISLATION
The act relating to the crime of desertion and withholding of support
(for a wife and children) has been amended 113 to provide that the with-
holding of support by either the husband or the wife must be done wilfully.
The amended act' 3la seemingly places the husband and wife on a plane
of equality by eliminating the former requirement that a mother had
to be required by law to care for and support her child before she was guilty
of withholding support. Finally, the former provision for a bond and
release from jail has been eliminated.
It is now a crime for any person wilfully to misapply funds paid by
another or by any governmental agency for the support of a child. Mis-
applied funds are those "spent for any purpose other than for necessary
and proper home, food, clothing, and the necessities of life, which expendi-
ture results in depriving the child of the above named necessities.
1" 4
Although this statute seems designed to eliminate the abuse of welfare
funds, it may result in a number of criminal charges being filed by vengeful
divorced husbands.
SEPARATION AND ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
The obligation of a man to support his former wife usually terminates
upon his death or upon her remarriage." 5 This obligation can, of course,
be continued after death by proper provisions in a separation agreement.
For example, in Pentland v. Pentland"6 the parties agreed that the husband
was to make annual "gifts" of 3,000 dollars to the wife for a period of five
years, and 1,000 dollars per year thereafter until the wife remarried or died. In
the event that the husband predeceased his wife, the "gifts" were to continue
as a lien upon the estate of the husband. The court, although recognizing the
usual rule that a promise to make a gift is unenforceable because of a
lack of consideration, ruled that consideration was to be found in the "over-
all agreement""' between the parties.
Almost all separation agreements are made during periods of emotional
stress. However, unless there is proof that a husband "was not fully capable
111. Mason v. Mason, 122 So.2d 577, 578 (Fla. App. 1960).
112. Mason v. Mason, supra note 111.
113. Fla. Laws 1961, cb. 61-335.
113a. FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1961).
114. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-216.
115. See 13 U. MAMI L. REV. 378 (1959).
116. 113 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1959).
117. Id. at 877.
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of understanding the situation with which he was faced or that he was
unable to exercise good judgment, '""18 the agreement will not be set aside.
Further, the validity of a separation agreement does not depend upon a
provision "for the continued separation of the parties. ' '" 19
Required Formalities
Three cases dealing with "oral" separation agreements and "oral" modi-
fications of separation agreements serve to confuse an already muddled
subject. In Dodd v. Dodd 120 a former wife filed suit asking the court to
enforce a property settlement which allegedly had been made orally between
the parties prior to divorce. The wife alleged that she had contributed by
her efforts to the husband's acquisition of a substantial estate, and that he
had failed to comply with his promise to give her one-half of his estate
subsequent to the divorce. The court held that she stated a cause of action
even though her testimony at the original divorce hearing (a transcript
of the testimony was attached to the complaint) showed that she had
voluntarily waived all claims against her husband in return for a cash settle-
ment which she had received. It is difficult to ascertain the basis for this
decision unless one is prepared to characterize the complaint as being'
based upon fraud; if it is so based, the facts do not seem to fit the charge.
This latitude in accepting an oral out-of-court separation agreement was not
repeated when the oral agreement was made in the presence of the court,
for it was held that a chancellor is not bound under the rules of procedure
121
to accept an oral property settlement agreement made in open court even
though it is "incorporated in the stenographic notes of the proceedings."'
122
The chancellor may qualify his acceptance by requiring that the agreement
be reduced to writing by the parties when the wife indicates a lack of defi-
niteness as to her understanding of the agreement which had a "very sketchy
nature."' 23 Finally, one court has apparently countenanced the temporary
modification of alimony and child support payments (as provided by a final
decree which incorporated a separation agreement) by the oral agreement
of the parties.
2 4
It has been held that the amount of alimony provided for in a separa-
tion agreement may be increased when the husband's income has increased
considerably and the wife's anticipated expenses will also increase substan-
118. Bare v. Bare, 120 So.2d 186, 188 (Fla. App. 1960).
119. Ibid.
120. 114 So.2d 508 (Fla. App. 1959).
121. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.5(d).
122. Ibid.
123. Cooke v. Cooke, 126 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. App. 1961).
124. Hilson v. Hilson, 127 So.2d 126 (Fla. App. 1961); but see, Walden v. Walden,
114 So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1959), which reversed the lower court because it considered
a purported release by the wife of monies due under an approved separation agreement
at an ex parte hearing.
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tially.12 The facts alleged failed to indicate that the anticipated increase
in expenses was based upon any past experience; it is to be wondered if
conjectural estimates should be utilized when most wives have little trouble
in anticipating additional needs.
Antenuptial Agreements
If an antenuptial agreement provides that the wife is to receive a sum
of money in lieu of any interest in her husband's estate provided that the
"sum shall be paid not later than six (6) months after the death" 12 of
the husband, the payment of this money within the provided period is a
condition precedent to her performance. Therefore, the widow would not
have to surrender possession of homestead property unless the payment
were made within the stipulated time.
127
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing a district court, has adhered
to the view that the Florida courts have jurisdiction over separate mainte-
nance actions brought under section 65.09127a of the Florida Statutes even
though neither party has resided in this state for the six month period
required for a divorce. 128  The court has reiterated the same rule when the
separate maintenance action was brought under section 65.10,128a even
though neither spouse ever resided in Florida and the wife secured service
upon the defendant "when he landed at the Miami Airport on his way to
Nassau." 129
In order for a wife to be entitled to alimony unconnected with divorce
under section 65.09 of the Florida Statutes, she must allege that a ground for
divorce exists and that the parties are married. Therefore, when the wife
alleges in her complaint that her husband secured a divorce from her in a
foreign state and she does not attack this divorce, this operates as a bar
to her suit. Her only recourse is under sections 65.04(8) 129a and 65.09
of the Florida Statutes under the theory of a "divisible divorce."' 30  And
if the husband has not been guilty of a ground for divorce and has not
failed to support his wife, she is not entitled to separate maintenance under
either section of the statutes.' 3 '
125. Terry v. Terry, 126 So.2d 890 (Fla. App. 1961).
126. Cohen v. Rothman, 127 So.2d 143, 144' (Fla. App. 1961).
127. Cohen v. Rothman, supra note 126.
127a. FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1961).
128. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 125 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1960), reversing 116 So.2d 649 (Fla.
App. 1960).
128a. FLA. STAT. § 65.10 (1961).
129. Martin v. Martin, 128 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 1961).
129a. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(8) (1961).
130. Coppersmith v. Coppersmith, 127 So.2d 711 (Fla. App. 1961).
131. Poerschke v. Poerschke, 114 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1959); accord, Raynes v.
Raynes, 128 So.2d 417 (Fla. App. 1961).
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A wife will be estopped from claiming separate maintenance when she
has obtained a Mexican mail-order divorce even though the decree is subse-
quently invalidated by a New York court.
32
In a divorce suit when a wife counterclaims for alimony unconnected
with divorce, it is erroneous to increase a prior support order of a foreign
state unless the counterclaim seeks to enforce the foreign order. Neverthe-
less, when the amount of the increase is justified by the circumstances of
the parties, the error will be treated as a harmless one.
1 33
Only two cases dealt with the measurement of the amount of separate
maintenance. The first case merely held that when a wife shared an apart-
ment with her self-supporting daughter by a prior marriage, the amount
of the separate maintenance should be decreased by one half of the rent for
the apartment. 34 In the second case the court held that a wife is entitled
to support from her husband "so long as he has any means of support and
she has need for support."' 35  As a result of this reasoning, the wife was
awarded sixty dollars per month from a husband who received 300 dollars
per month as the proceeds from the sale of his business and who was unable
to work because of a heart condition.'36
Legislation
A husband living in this state separate and apart from his wife and
minor children, whether or not the separation is through his fault, may now
obtain a decree adjudicating his obligation to support his wife and minor
children and his visitation rights in regard to the children. Of course, this
remedy may not be granted when there are other pending civil proceed-
ings.1'3 With the usual propensity of women to institute litigation promptly,
it is doubtful that this statute will be of much practical use.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
There is no legal authority for a chancellor to order that a wife pay
attorney's fees to her counsel in a divorce suit; her attorneys must bring
a law action in order to recover. As a corollary, a chancellor has no authority
to deny the wife the right to relief in any future divorce litigation until she
pays the judgment for attorney's fees.13 8  Similarly, when there is a dispute
between a husband and his former attorneys as to the amount of legal fees,
the chancellor has no power to enter a rule to show cause against the hus-
band for the fees. The amount of fees must be determined by a separate
132. Furman v. Furman, 130 So.2d 316 (Fla. App. 1961).
133. Brickel v. Brickel, 122 So.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1960).
134. Reid v. Reid, 113 So.2d 574 (Fla. App. 1959).
135. Bloom v. Bloom, 131 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. App. 1961).
136. Bloom v. Bloom, supra note 135.
137.. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-112 (Now FLA. STAT. § 65.101 (1959)).
138. Cristiani v. Cristiani, 114 So.2d 726 (Fla. App. 1959).
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action on the law side of the court. The chancellor may (and seemingly
should) order that when there has been a substitution of attorneys, the
client must file a bond in such amount as the chancellor deems proper to
secure payment to the attorneys of any judgment that may be entered
in the separate law action.
139
It is error to charge the joint assets of a husband and wife with sums
awarded to the wife's attorney when the husband was ordered to pay these
sums.'40 If the divorce decree fails to provide that the husband is to pay
attorney's fees and suit money to the wife, she may not recover these amounts
in a subsequent suit against the husband.' 4 ' Although it is proper to award
attorney's fees for services performed in the enforcement of a decree pro-
viding for alimony, it is improper to award fees for services rendered in




It would appear that a child may be removed from one county to
another with the oral consent of the county judge of the first county, and
the second county will have jurisdiction of the child in guardianship pro-
ceedings. Any questions relating to venue must be raised in the lower
court; they cannot be raised for the first time in the appellate court in
order to invalidate the proceedings.'
4'
Some thorny questions relating to appeals in guardianship cases have
been answered during the last two years. It appears that an order of the
county judge denying a petition for restoration of competency must be
appealed to the district court (not the circuit court), and the appeal must
be filed within 15 days (rather than 60 days) from the entry of the order.
144
The temporary commitment of a person for medical treatment by the county
judge may not be attacked in the circuit court in habeas corpus proceedings
for "a determination of irregularity, insufficiency in form or substance or
for other matters going to the propriety of the order.'' a  The habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited to those cases in which it appears
that the commitment order was void.' 46  The rights of an adjudicated
incompetent will be protected, for the adjudication does not preclude him
from employing an attorney and perfecting an appeal from the adjudicatory
139. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 122 So.2d 24 (Fla. App. 1960), approved and cert.
denied sub nom. Cypen, Salmon & Cypen v. Chaachou, 130 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1961).
140. Simon v. Simon, 123 So.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1960).
141. Zoercher v. Zoercher, 114 So.2d 728 (Fla. App. 1959).
142. Terry v. Terry, 126 So.2d 890 (Fla. App. 1961). In Pentland v. Pentland, 114
So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1959), the court refused to award $16,500 as the wife's attorney's
fees for perfecting a successful appeal and ordered that $2,500 was sufficient.
143. In re De Hart, 114 So.2d 13 (Fla. App. 1959).
144. In re Guardianship of Campbell, 114 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1959). See Nash,
Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24, 47 (1961).
145. Clark v. State ex rel. Rubin, 122 So.2d 807, 812 (Fla. App. 1960).
146. Clark v. State ex rel. Rubin, supra note 145.
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order. If the converse were the rule, "the law would be doing a monstrous
thing, for such a person would be precluded from appealing by the appel-
late court's giving effect to an order the very validity of which is sought to
be reviewed by appeal.' 47
In accordance with the usual rule governing a guardianship case, a
curator of an incompetent's property who is accused of mismanagement
will not be protected by the fact that his previous accountings have been
approved by the circuit court. Thie approval of the accountings by the
court does not have the force of a judgment, and the court may make an
additional examination of annual accountings made years previously. 148
An incompetent widow must elect (through her guardian) to take
dower within nine months after the first publication of the notice to
creditors, otherwise the right to elect is lost even though the guardian might
not be appointed until after the nine month period had elapsed. 149 Although
this seems to be a correct application of the statutes, 1 0 it would seem
that an incompetent can be deprived of her right to dower by the deliberate
or inadvertent actions of members of her family in delaying the institution
of guardianship proceedings. This does not seem to be consistent with the
usual solicitude of the law for the protection of incompetents. The remedy
would seem to lie with the legislature.
The obligation of an estate to pay fees to a guardian pursuant to a
court order cannot be evaded by the fact that the guardian is also a member
of a law firm which is acting as counsel for the estate; his intra-firm dealings
with his guardianship fees are of no concern to the estate.' 5' The Florida
Supreme Court has approved the use of a local bar association's minimum
fee schedule as the criterium for awarding attorney's fees in a guardianship
matter. Inasmuch as the minimum fee schedule is based upon a percentage
of the assets of the estate under the control of the guardian, any assets which
were not under the control of the guardian because they were located in
a foreign state could not be included in the arithmetic computations. 5 2
Legislation
The Florida Legislature has finally abandoned the use of the medieval
147. Marshall v. Howe, 121 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla. App. 1960).
148. Stevens v. Hooks, 125 So.2d 581 (Fla. A pp. 1960).
149. In re Estate of Aron, 118 So.2d 546 (Fa. App. 1960).
150. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.35 and 744.62 (1961).
151. Farish v. Jewett, 120 So.2d 642 (Fla. App. 1960). The county judge ordered
that the sum of $5,090 be paid to a law firm as attorney's fees and $4,900 to the guardian
who was also a member of this law firm. The guardian endorsed his guardianship fee
checks over to the: firm, terminated his association with the firm and then claimed that
the estate owed only $190. The county judge entered an order in accordance with the
contentions of the guardian, but :the district court held that the order provided that
the estate was to pay $5,090 to the firm as well as $4,900 to the guardian. What the
guardian did with his checks after receiving them was no concern of the court and would
not alter the obligation of the estate'to pay the fees awarded.
152. Lucom v. Potter, 131 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1961).
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terms "insane asylums" and "lunatics and insane persons" by substituting
the more euphemistic terms "hospitals for the mentally ill" and "mentally
ill persons" in those statutes dealing with the state hospitals. 15
The venue provisions of the guardianship law have been amended to
provide that whenever the domicile of an incompetent is changed to another
county, the guardian may file a petition reciting this fact and the venue
of the guardianship proceedings will be changed to the county of acquired
domicile. 15 4 The guardianship laws now provide the procedure necessary
in the closing of a Florida guardianship when the domicile of the ward has
been lawfully changed to a foreign state which has appointed a guardian
of the property of the ward.'--"
The Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers 5"
has been enacted. It is obviously designed to protect corporations and
transfer agents from liability to beneficiaries when the fiduciary has acted
in breach of his duties, and the corporation or transfer agent has no actual
notice of the breach. The theory of constructive notice has been virtually
eliminated by the statute. In accord with this new act, the guardianship
laws have been amended to provide that upon the entry of an order by a
court of competent jurisdiction, a guardian shall have the power to hold
corporate stock or mutual investment trust shares in his name "with or
without disclosing any fiduciary relationship."
15 7
Section 665.15 of the Florida Statutes was amended 1 58 to provide that
in the event that one or more of the cotenants of an account in a building
and loan association or in a federal savings and loan association is declared
incompetent, the account and any dividends thereon may be paid to the
guardian or to the remaining cotenant. The release or quittance of the
person receiving payment shall be a valid release and discharge of the
association. This act will have the effect of protecting the associations
at the expense of incompetents.
Section 744.13(2) of the Florida Statutes has been amended' 59 to
provide that the natural guardians of a child may without appointment
collect and dispose of property inherited or "otherwise accruing" to the
child when the amount is not in excess of 1,000 dollars. In the event
that a personal injury or other tort claim is involved, the powers of
the natural guardians may be exercised only when the amount of the settle-
ment does not exceed 500 dollars.
153. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-18.
154. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-114.
155. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-393 (now FLA. STAT. § 746.121 (1961)).
156. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-204.
157. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-327.
158. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-136.
159. Fla. Laws 1861, ch. 61-395.
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The case of Sheafer v. Sheafer,10° which held that the provisions of
section 745.11 of the Florida Statutes which forbade the sale of an incompe-
tent's property for more than scventy-five per cent credit on the purchase
price and for longer than five years as being binding upon a county judge,
has been superseded by an amendment to the statute.'" The amendment
provides that the county judge may in his discretion by a written order
authorize a "larger per cent of credit" and enlarge the time for payment.
The family allowance provisions of the probate laws have been amended
to provide that mentally or physically incompetent adult children have the
right to share in the family allowance.10 ,2  Formerly, only the widow and
minor children could share.
ADOPTION
A natural parent has a legal right to the custody of his child which should
not be denied because the child expresses a desire to remain with persons
who have had de facto custody in the past. The child's welfare is presumed
to be served best by the care and custody of his natural parents, and this
presumption will not be overcome unless there are compelling reasons to
the contrary. This would seem particularly true when the father was awarded
custody by a decree of a foreign state, and there has been no changc in
circumstances since the rendition of this decree.'6 3 This legal right to
continued custody becomes even more pronounced when the child is the
subject of adoption proceedings by others. For example, the natural mother
should not be deprived of her child when she did not abandon him and has
shown fitness and ability to care for him, even though the child has spent
nearly all his life with his paternal grandparents who sought to adopt him.
This is true in spite of the fact that the State Welfare Board recommended
that the adoption be granted.Y4  Adoption will be granted when it is for
the best interests of the child, particularly when the adopting parent is the
child's stepmother who has married the child's natural father. 6 5
160. 126 So.2d 893 (Fla. App. 1961).
161. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-184.
162. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-391.
163. In re Adoption of Vermeulen, 114 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1959). Subsequent
proceedings in this case illustrate the point that even though the chancellor disagrees with
the mandate of the appellate court which has reversed the chancellor in a child custody
case, he has no right to disqualify himself because of the fact that his "mind . is so
firmly fixed upon the correctness of said decree that it might influence his official action
in any further consideration of this matter." In ro Adoption of Vermeulen, 122 So.2d
318, 320 (Fla. App. 1960). Compliance with the mandate by the chancellor is a minis-
terial act which cannot be avoided because of some preconceived notion as to the correct-
ness of the appellate decision. It was also error for the substituted chancello" to take the
case under advisement; he also must comply with the mandate and upon his failure
to do so, the appellate court had no other rcconrse but to enter a decree which the lower
court should have entered.
164. In re Adoption of Chakmakis, 116 So.2d 75 (Fla. App. 1959). In subsequent
proceedings, the court clarified its opinion by reiterating that the adoption decree was
vacated and that the chancellor was directed to transfer the possession and custody of the
child to his mother. In re Adoption of Chakmakis, 116 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1959).
165. Rose v. Rose, 128 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 1961).
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This legal right to custody may be lost when the parent has abandoned
his child. Abandonment is a factual question which would not be proved
by the fact that a father left his child with his wealthy wife (pursuant to
their separation agreement which was confirmed by the trial court). until
he had completed his medical school training. Whether this agreement
would validly relieve a father of his legal duty to support his child is a
matter of some conjecture.161'
In a case of first impression,16 7 the district court has held that a written
consent for adoption given by the natural mother need not contain the
names of the adopting parents. The court further held that the consent
must be executed in the presence of two witnesses; a consent executed in
the presence of only one witness is invalid. The court attempted to dis-
tinguish Pugh v. Barwick'0 8 which held that a simple unwitnessed letter
agreeing to an adoption was sufficient in the "particular instance."'16 9 It is
difficult for the author to understand how the statute170 can be a cast-iron
rule in the instant case and a flexible standard in Pugh.
Legislation
Section 72.34 of the Florida Statutes has been amended' 7 ' to provide
that a spouse of a natural parent may adopt the adult children of the natural
parent, provided that the adopting spouse is more than ten years older
than the adult adoptees.
JUVENILES AND JUVENILE COURTS
Juvenile Courts
An appeal from a final order of a juvenile court must be made within
ten days (rather than sixty days) after entry of the order.172  The remedy
of habeas corpus may not be utilized to reach alleged errors in substance
and procedure in the juvenile and domestic relations court which occurred
prior to contempt proceedings; these errors, which do not affect the legality
of custody, may be reached only by appeal. 173
When a juvenile court has returned custody of two older children
to their natural parents, it is an abuse of discretion for the court later to
refuse to restore custody of three younger children when the evidence
166. In re Adoption of Prangley, 122 So.2d 423 (Fla. App. 1960).
167. McKinney v. Weeks, 130 So.2d 310 (Fla. App. 1961).
168. 56 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1952).
169. Id. at 126.
170. FLA. STAT. § 72.14 (1961).
171. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-445.
172. In re Evans. 116 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1960).
173. Cook v. Culbreath, 124 So.2d 24 (Fla. App. 1960).
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indicates without contradiction that the parents have been rehabilitated
morally and economically." 4
The Attorney General of the State of Florida has ruled that a juvenile
court is without authority to deprive parents of the permanent custody of
their children under the age of seventeen years unless the children are first
committed to a licensed child placing agency for adoption. Of course,
notice would have to be given to the parents before the children were
permanently committed to the agency.175 The Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Dade County has the authority to award attorney's
fees in cases transferred to it from the circuit court in the same manner




The protective veil surrounding the identity of juvenile offenders has
been partially removed in that the records of juvenile traffic violators must
be kept in the full names of the violators and must be open to inspection
and publication in the same manner as adult traffic violators.177 The former
law which seemed to provide that the juvenile court had original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all violations of the school attendance laws whether
by juveniles or adults has been clarified. The juvenile court retains juris-
diction over juvenile offenders while adult offenders (parents and employers)
are to be tried in the court in each county "having jurisdiction of misde-
meanors wherein trial by jury is afforded the defendant." 178
Criminal Cases Involving Juveniles
Section 932.38179 of the Florida Statutes is a simply written statute
requiring that notice be given to the parents or guardians of any minor
who is charged with any offense before any court of this state. In the last
two years, at least twenty-two cases have arisen under this statute. The
majority of these cases indicate that the officials of the criminal courts
of this state are either unwilling or unable to follow the simple requirements
which protect the basic due process rights of juveniles.
174. Kersey v. State, 124 So.2d 726 (Fla. App. 1960).
175. [1959-1960] FLA. ATT'Y. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 452.
176. Fla. Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 060.11, January 13, 1960, see 34 FLA. B. 1. 146 (1960).
177. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-54.
178. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-101.
179. FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1961). "Parent or guardian to be notified before trial of
offense against minor; service of notice.-When any minor, not married, may be charged
with any offense and brought before any of the courts, including municipal courts, of
this state, due notice of such charge prior to the trial thereof shall be given to the
parents or guardian of such minor, provided the name and address of such parent or guard-
ian may be known to the court, or to the executive officers thereof. In the event that the
name of such parent or guardian is not known or made known to the court or executive
officer or cannot be reasonably ascertained by him, then such notice shall be given to any
other relative or friend whom such minor may designate.
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If the minor is brought to trial without the required notice being given,
he is entitled to be discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus. The failure to
comply with the statute is absolutely fatal.' 80 A failure to comply with this
statute is fatal even though the minor subsequently is convicted of the offense
of escape while imprisoned for a prior felony conviction.' 8 ' If the minor
has been married and subsequently divorced, no notice need be given to
his parents. 182 If the minor's marital status is not clear because of state-
ments made by the minor, the trial court should either give the required
notice or undertake to clarify his marital status. 1 3 In the absence of posi-
tive allegations by the state in habeas corpus proceedings that the judge
in the criminal trial inquired of the minor as to his marital status, it is
not sufficient for the state to rely on the "unvarying custom"'1 84 of the
particular judge to ask whether prisoners are or have been married. Further,
in the absence of definite allegations that the minor misrepresented his
marital status to the judge, there would not be a sufficient basis for an
estoppel because of an absence of reliance by the judge. Whether the
principle of estoppel will be applicable to this statute under proper circum-
stances was not decided.'8 5
The notice requirement is not met when an official of the court writes
to the minor's mother after the minor has entered a plea of guilty, but
before he has been sentenced; the statute requires due notice "prior to the
trial thereof."' 6 The phrase "due notice" is satisfied if the notice is sent
by registered mail to the appropriate person a full ten days before the date
of conviction. 87  It is not satisfied when the parent of a minor child is
hundreds of miles from where the child is imprisoned and a letter sent by
the minor is received by his mother one day in advance of the trial. 8
Similarly, notice sent by a juvenile probation officer to the minor's mother
in New Hampshire advising that her minor son was held for hearing on
The service of notice required by this section to be given to the parent, or guardian
or other person provided therein may be made as the service of summons ad respondendum
is made; or in the event such parent, or guardian or other person provided herein may be
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, then, and in that event, service may be made by
registered mail, or by telegram, and return of such service shall be made by the executive
officer of the court in the same manner as returns are made upon summons ad
respondendum."
Note, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1961).
180. Jones v. Cochran, 125 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1960); Di Marco v. Cochran, 124 So.2d
130 (Fla. 1960); Kinard v. Cochran, 113 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1959).
181. Raggen v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1961); accord, Giles v. Cochran, 129
So.2d 426 (Fla. 1961); Williams v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1961).
182. Harris v. Cochran, 122 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1960); Hewett v. Cochran, 117 So.2d
3 (Fla. 1960).
183. State ex. rel. York v. Cochran, 127 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1961). See also Penley v.
Cochran, 131 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1961); Negron v. Cochran, 130 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1961);
Champion v. Cochran, 128 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1961).
184. Willis v. Cochran, 131 So.2d 728, 729 (Fla. 1961).
185. Willis v. Cochran, supra note 184.
186. Thompson v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1961).
187. Tohnson v. Cochran, 124 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1960).
188. Thompson v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1961).
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the following day in the juvenile court was not a compliance with the
statute, particularly when the juvenile court transferred jurisdiction to a
criminal court and two weeks later the minor pleaded guilty to a felony
and was sentenced to the state prison.189
Notice need not be given if the parents have actual notice of the
minor's predicament prior to the trial.' 90 If the minor writes to his mother
simply telling her he is in jail without detailing the serious charges which
are pending against him, this would not be actual notice."" Under this
statute, the minor has no duty to disclose the names and addresses of his
parents or guardian; the duty rests upon the state to ascertain from the
minor or from other sources of information the names and addresses of
the minor's parents or guardians. When the minor informs the court that
his parents are dead, it is the duty of the court official to inquire as to the
existence of a guardian. If there is no guardian, then the minor must
be requested to name a relative or friend to receive the notice.1 92
In addition to the procedural due process safeguard of notice, it would
appear to be a denial of due process for a court to fail to make a determi-
nation whether or not a sixteen year old boy with a third grade education
is competent to represent himself without the assistance of counsel when
lie is being tried for grand larceny. This is particularly true when it appears
that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the minor, and the record




The maximum penalty for encouraging or contributing to the delin-
quency of a dependent or delinquent child has been increased to a fine
of 1,000 dollars or imprisonment in the county jail for one year, or both.19
In addition, the offense of causing a minor under the age of eighteen to
become a delinquent or dependent child has been redefined and maximum
penalties were added.195
The child labor laws were amended as to occupational exemptions,
messenger girls, hazardous occupations, hours of work in certain occupations,
and vocational education of children.' 96
ILLEGITIMACY
The appointment of a guardian ad litern to represent a minor defendant
189. Di Marco v. Cochran, 127 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1961).
190. Bowen v. Cochran, 121 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1960); accord, Brockman v. Cochran.
127 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1961); Centanni v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1961).
191. McGuirk v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1961).
192. State ex rel. Fox v. Cochran, 126 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1961).
193. Tones v. Cochran, 121 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1960).
194. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-319.
195. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-320.
196. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-182.
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in a bastardy proceeding is not mandatory; however, the trial court is
obligated either to appoint a guardian or make a determination that the
infant is protected without a guardian. A failure to make this determina-
tion renders the decree voidable upon appeal even though the minor's
father (his natural guardian) was present during most of the court pro-
ceedings and the minor was represented by able counsel.197  When due
notice of a final hearing has been served upon a defendant in a bastardy
case and the final decree recites that the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties, and the record is silent as to whether a
hearing was actually held, the appellate court must assume that the chan-
cellor acted properly despite the contentions of the putative father that
no hearing was held).98
Although it appears that the husband may contest the parentage when
a child is born in wedlock, the wife does not have a similar right. If this
rule is based upon the notion that it "most wisely and properly protects
the sanctity of married intercourse," 199 it seems difficult to justify a dual
standard. This decision seems to be based upon a historical anachronism
rather than logic. 200
197. Brown v. Ripley, 119 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1960).
198. Murray v. Murray, 117 So.2d 425 (Fla. A pp. 1960).
199. Sanders v. Yancey, 122 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. App. 1960).
200. Sanders v. Yancey, supra note 199. Substantially in accord, lllgen v. Carter,
123 So.2d 368 (Fla. App. 1960). See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 572 (1957).
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